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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the immortal words of Vice President Joe Biden, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act
1
 (“ACA” or the “Act”) is a “big f---ing deal.”2  It accomplishes the United States’ most 
sweeping reform of healthcare law and our greatest expansion of healthcare access since the 
1965 enactment of Medicare
3
 and Medicaid.
4
  Nevertheless, the ACA leaves a few things to be 
desired.  Like many sweeping reforms, the Act entrusts large swaths of its implementation to the 
states.  This Article argues, from a purely functional perspective, that the federalist structure in 
the ACA is a mistake.  Healthcare regulation in the modern age should be a national project 
entrusted solely to the central government.
5
 
 Our concern here is not with constitutional limits on national or state authority.  Although 
such limits undoubtedly exist and although those limits are certainly important, this Article will 
focus on the functional advantages that the state governments on the one hand and the national 
government on the other
6
 can bring to healthcare regulation.  Our concern is not, for example, 
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1
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.  
2
 Nick Graham, ‘A Big F---ing Deal’: Biden’s Health Care Reform F-Bomb on Live TV 
(VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2010, 12:24 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/23/a-big-fucking-deal-bidens_n_509927.html. 
3
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006). 
4
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). 
5
 For the sake of clarity and consistency, we will use “national government” or “central 
government” rather than “federal government” to refer to Congress, the presidency, and the 
Article III judiciary.  We will use “federal” and “federalism” to refer to a system comprised of 
one national government and several sub-national governments, in this case one national 
government and fifty state governments. 
6
 See generally Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism, (Illinois 
Law and Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE06-001, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875626. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983398
 2 
whether the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause7 or 
whether the Medicaid expansion represents an unconstitutional commandeering of state 
agencies.
8
  Instead, it is whether the ACA’s private insurance regulations, public insurance 
provisions, and health and wellness incentives would be best managed at the state or national 
level.  Assuming that the goals of controlling the costs of medical care, expanding Americans’ 
access to healthcare coverage, and bolstering the quality of medical interventions are worthy 
goals, who should be in charge of overseeing them?  Should it be the state governments, the 
national government, or some combination of the two? 
 Early in this nation’s history, our resounding answer was that healthcare and public 
health regulations should be left exclusively to the states.
9
  In the New Deal and Great Society 
movements, however, the national government intervened in many areas of state control, 
including healthcare,
10
 and the emergent healthcare regulatory system has been one of mixed and 
often confused authority.  Only a handful of healthcare programs, most notably Medicare
11
 and 
the Military Health System (“MHS”),12 are governed exclusively at the national level, while 
countless others, including Medicaid,
13
 the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(“SCHIP”),14 and the vast majority of private health insurance regulations,15 are governed jointly 
or, perhaps more accurately, disjointedly at the national and state levels.   
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40 (2009) (discussing constitutional question of compulsory health insurance 
prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act and finding that it would be valid under 
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers); David B. Rivkin Jr., Lee A. Casey & Jack M. Balkin, A 
Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 93 (2009) (debating the constitutionality of the individual mandate); Virginia v. 
Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding the individual mandate is an 
unconstitutional exercise of the commerce clause as regulating “inactivity”); Elizabeth Weeks 
Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663947 (discussing 
the health reform nullification movement).  See generally Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10 Civ. 188 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.oag.state.va.us/PRESS_RELEASES/Cuccinelli/Comm%20v.%20Sebelius%20-
%20Complaint%20filed%20with%20Court%20_323_10.pdf; see also Complaint, Florida v. 
Sebelius, (N.D. Fla. March 23, 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-91) (complaint includes 13 states), 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flndce/3:2010cv00091/57507/1/. 
8
 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius (2010) (No. 3:10 Civ. 
91) (alleging that Medicaid expansion and requirements for state-run health insurance exchanges 
and high risk pools violate the Tenth Amendment by “commandeering the [states] and their 
employees as agents of the federal government’s regulatory scheme at the states’ own cost.”). 
9
 See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
10
 See id. at 235–90, 367–74. 
11
 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006). 
12
 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1110 (2006). 
13
 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). 
14
 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2006). 
15
 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006) 
(preempting state regulation of employer provided benefits including health benefits); see 
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Part of the reason that lawmakers have chosen “cooperative federalism”16—or this 
disjointed mess—is that Congress is self-consciously a federalist institution.  Despite being the 
lawmaking body for the central government (or perhaps, from the Framers’ perspective, because 
it is the lawmaking body for a central government
17
), Congress is structured to be protective of 
states’ interests.  The Senate in particular embodies the Founders’ state-protective instinct, 
providing each state with equal representation notwithstanding their wildly varying 
populations.
18
  It is therefore structurally difficult to pass legislation that would centralize 
regulatory authority in the national government at the expense of state control.  This story of 
senatorial protection for federalism certainly played out in the ACA’s passage; the House version 
of the bill would have centralized regulatory authority far more than the enacted Senate bill did. 
Our problem with this structural story and with the legislation that results from it is that 
the modern era of law and regulation is dramatically different from that of the founding.  In a 
largely technocratic age, in which regulation centers increasingly on data and analysis and in 
which data flow instantaneously and human beings flow quickly across state borders, the 
functional advantages of state and local regulation have all but disappeared.  This is especially 
true in a field like healthcare, which benefits significantly from aggregation of information 
across large numbers of people—which benefits from economies of scale.  Additionally, in an 
era of increasingly data-driven regulation, the central government is capable of capturing many 
of the historic advantages of state and local regulation without leaving any implementation 
                                                                                                                                                             
generally THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HOW PRIVATE HEALTH COVERAGE WORKS: A 
PRIMER 2008 UPDATE (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7766.pdf  
(providing an overview of state licensing procedures and competing federal regulation 
preempting state control); MILA KOFMAN & KAREN POLLITZ, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HEALTH 
POLICY INSTITUTE, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION BY STATES AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: A REVIEW OF CURRENT APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 1, (2006), 
available at 
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/HealthInsuranceReportKofmanandPollitz-95.pdf 
(discussing the divide between federal and state regulatory powers prior to the enactment of the 
Health Insurance Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act); Russell Korobkin, The 
Battle over Self-insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another”, 5 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89 (2005) (describing ERISA preemption and the differing standards 
regulating private and self-insurers).  
16
 See generally Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 479-82 (1938) 
(introducing a symposium on “cooperative federalism”); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, 
State Constitutionalism and the Right to Healthcare, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1338 (2010) 
(cooperative federalism programs are those in which a state “receive[s] a percentage-on-the-
dollar match from the federal government for every state dollar spent.”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983) (discussing the 
desirability of cooperation through federal funding programs vis-à-vis preemption or 
commandeering state officials). 
17
 See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 359 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966). 
18
 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States  
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547–48   
(1954). 
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authority to the state governments.  Because data-driven regulation is largely objectivist, the 
national government can run policy experiments that tell us as much as or even more than state-
based experimentation; it can gather variegated data on local policy preferences; and it can vary 
policy implementation to respond to those preferences. 
The ACA recognizes much of this modern story by placing national agencies at the 
forefront of implementing healthcare reform.  But in several significant respects, the Act falls 
short of centralizing regulatory authority in the national government.  It leaves states responsible 
for implementing the insurance exchanges, the general regulations of private insurance, the 
Medicaid and SCHIP programs, and several demonstration projects. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Part II makes the case that the national government is 
functionally superior to state and local governments for healthcare regulation in the modern age.  
Part III considers the successes and failures of the ACA in centralizing healthcare regulation.  
Part IV concludes. 
II.  FUNCTIONAL FEDERALISM AND HEALTHCARE REGULATION 
There are a number of purely functional factors that one can consider when choosing 
between state and national governments for regulating healthcare.  Each level of government 
captures different advantages, and each suffers from different disadvantages.  In analyzing 
functional rather than constitutional federalism, scholars generally consider the following 
factors: (1) experimentation, (2) voice, (3) diversity, (4) exit, (5) uniformity, (6) scale, (7) 
spillover prevention, and (8) redistribution.
19
  The first four factors represent advantages of 
smaller governments; the latter four represent advantages of the national government. 
This part will briefly describe each of the functional factors, positing first, that the 
national government’s advantages are particularly important for healthcare regulation and, 
second, that the national government can (and sometimes does) design healthcare regulations to 
recapture many of the states’ functional advantages without using state governments for 
implementation. 
A.  The Functional Factors 
1.  Advantages of State and Local Governance 
a.  Experimentation  
 Experimentation—the ability of states to act as laboratories of democracy20—is 
probably the most frequently invoked functional advantage of state governance.
21
  In a federal 
system, the smaller units of government—in our case the states—can run live tests of different 
policy approaches.  The national government can then see which approaches work and which 
don’t and can choose whether or not to enact a successful approach nationwide.  If policy leaders 
hypothesize, for example, that capping noneconomic and punitive damages in medical 
                                                 
19
 See generally Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 6; Scott L. Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health 
Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 203 (2010). 
20
 New Ice State Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
21
 See, e.g., Craig Volden, State as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (2006); Charles Fried, Federalism—Why 
Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1982). 
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malpractice litigation will reduce the practice of defensive medicine, will curb inflation in 
liability insurance, or will improve the quality of medical care, then they can convince a handful 
of representative states, say California and Texas, to enact such caps.  They can then see what 
actually happens.  If the caps work to accomplish the stated goals, then other states’ legislators 
can enact the same caps, or Congress can enact them nationwide.
22
  If the caps do not work, 
policymakers can try a different approach elsewhere.  State governance thus provides 
information about the usefulness of a given policy approach. 
b. Voice   
 The second advantage of small government is that state and local representatives have 
fewer constituents than national representatives, allowing them to gather more and better 
information about their electorates’ policy preferences.  If smaller governments are directly 
involved in shaping and implementing policy, then each constituent will have greater voice in 
that project.  If, by contrast, the national government is solely responsible for policymaking, the 
smallest constituent group will be about 560,000 people, the size of the smallest congressional 
district in the House of Representatives.
23
  No matter how conscientious, a single representative 
cannot communicate effectively with that many people about their specific policy preferences. 
c. Diversity and Exit   
 The third and fourth advantages of state involvement in policy implementation—
diversity and exit—are closely related.  State or local governmental control has the advantage of 
allowing policy diversity within a single country.  Diversity of this kind has two beneficial 
effects.
24
  First, it allows states to fine-tune their policies to the specific needs of their 
constituencies, in case the citizens of Texas have different needs and preferences on a given 
policy question than the citizens of California.  This is a straightforward advantage of diversity.  
Second, policy diversity allows residents to exit one jurisdiction in favor of another, thereby 
facilitating competition among the states for resident taxpayers—a theoretical advantage first 
advanced by Charles Tiebout.
25
  Under the Tiebout theory of federalism, the states’ diversity of 
policy approaches allows taxpayers to choose among different bundles of taxes and services by 
“voting with their feet,” creating a market-like environment that will theoretically result in 
optimal policy bundles.
26
  In other words, states will compete for taxpayers by setting policy 
according to constituents’ preferences, and the constituent population that stays in a given state 
(rather than moving) will be the population that gains the most value from the policy bundle 
offered.
27
  If, by contrast, the national government is solely responsible for setting policy and it 
chooses a monolithic policy bundle for the entire country, then citizens are stuck.  The cost of 
                                                 
22
 The process of state mimicry of successful policy is known as “policy diffusion” and is an oft-
studied phenomenon in political science. 
23
 If apportioned correctly, each congressional district should contain about 690,000 people, or 
300 million people divided into 435 districts.  The state of Wyoming, however, has one 
representative despite having a total population of about 560,000 people.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
RESIDENT POPULATION CHANGE (2010).  
24
 See Greer & Jacobson, supra note 19, at 214. 
25
 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). 
26
 Id. 
27
 See generally id. 
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exit in that case—the cost of moving out of the country—is significantly higher than the cost of 
moving to a different state within the United States. 
2.  Advantages of National Governance 
a. Uniformity   
 Perhaps the best-known and most frequently invoked advantage of national regulation 
is uniformity: the ability of the national government to set consistent standards nationwide.  
Uniformity is particularly important when regulated interests, such as manufacturers  or 
employers, operate in several states or nationwide.  In that case, state control would force multi-
state entities to learn and to comply with up to fifty different sets of rules.  Uniformity 
significantly decreases the costs of compliance. 
b. Scale  
 A second advantage of national governance is that it benefits from economies of 
scale.  The term “economies of scale” refers to the cost advantages of expansion or increased 
production.
28
  For a standard corporation, the cost per unit of production might go down as the 
corporation produces more units, especially if the corporation experiences high fixed costs.  For 
government, the same phenomenon might occur if the cost per instance of regulation decreases 
as the number of regulated individuals increases.  Furthermore, government frequently acts like a 
private corporation or private business, providing goods and services directly, either at taxpayer 
expense or on a fee-for-service basis.  In that case, public programs might benefit from 
economies of scale for exactly the same reasons that private corporations would: the cost of 
producing public goods might decrease as the number of units produced increases.  For public 
regulations and public goods that benefit from scale, putting the national government in charge 
has the obvious advantage of increasing the regime’s or program’s size relative to any given 
state’s population.  
c. Spillover Prevention 
   The third advantage of national control is really a justification for federal 
intervention—a correction of diseased state governance rather than a true virtue of national 
governance.  The states are sometimes able to externalize the negative effects of their regulatory 
regimes, distorting their regulatory incentives, and the national government can correct that 
distortion.  The best example of this spillover problem is environmental regulation; the negative 
effects of under-regulating environmental harms often flow downstream to neighboring states.  
This problem is the one that gives rise to “races to the bottom” in state regulation.29  Although 
the national government might also be able to externalize costs onto neighbors—in this case 
neighboring countries—the national government certainly internalizes more of its own costs than 
any given state.  In a regulatory regime that experiences spillover effects, therefore, the national 
government might be better motivated to regulate well. 
d. Redistribution   
                                                 
28
 See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 85–88 (4th ed. 2005). 
29
 See Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health Care Policy: States and the Old 
Questions, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 6470 (1986); see also Dale B. Thompson, Optimal 
Federalism Across Institutions: Theory and Applications From Environmental and Health Care 
Policies, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 437, 444 (2009) (discussing how uniform federal regulation 
“protects states from ruinous competition”). 
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 The final advantage of national regulation is its ability to redistribute resources from 
richer to poorer states.  In policy regimes in which voters believe that all Americans should 
receive a minimum floor of public goods or services, the national government can play a role in 
helping the poorer states to reach that floor. 
B.  The Functional Federalism of Healthcare 
What, then, are the factors that matter most for healthcare regulation?  Although 
American “healthcare regulation” is far from monolithic, we propose that economies of scale, 
redistribution, and perhaps spillover problems are important throughout the healthcare regulatory 
complex.  Scale, we argue, is the single most important functional factor for every regulatory 
question that falls under the broad umbrella of “healthcare,” and redistribution seems universally 
relevant because most Americans seem to believe that all citizens should receive a minimum 
floor of healthcare coverage.
30
  Spillovers might also be universally important, depending on the 
empirical reality of the “snowball effect,”31 and spillovers are probably at least sometimes 
relevant, regardless of whether or not the snowball effect is real.  Finally, uniformity is 
sometimes but not always important in healthcare.  
It is also true, of course, that policy diversity, voice, and experimentation are often, if not 
always, important to healthcare.  Those functional values could be protected through cooperative 
federalist programs that would capture benefits of scale, redistribution, and spillover prevention 
while relying on state implementation to accomplish diversity, voice, and experimentation.    We 
propose, however, that healthcare regulation will work better if, instead of relying on state 
implementation to get diversity, voice, and experimentation, the national government simply 
diversifies its own policy implementation to suit local needs, invests in accurate information 
about local preferences, and runs its own experiments to test new policy proposals, all of which 
are things that the central government does in the Medicare program.
32
  
1.  National Advantages in Healthcare 
a. Scale 
 Healthcare regulation, like many other regulatory regimes, has become increasingly 
objectivist and data-driven over the last several decades.  As such, the greatest need is not for 
voice or diversity—two important factors in subjectivist regulation, which depend on people’s 
preferences—but rather for scale to gather reliable data.  That is, in an objectivist regulatory 
world, where regulatory decision-making depends on cost-benefit and welfare analyses, the 
single greatest need is for information.  This is particularly true in healthcare, where the market 
failures that justify government intervention center on informational problems.  Healthcare is a 
credence good, meaning that consumers have a hard time evaluating the quality of healthcare 
goods both before and after consumption, and it is a good for which there are often asymmetries 
of information between buyers and sellers.  In a market with these particular failures, 
                                                 
30
 Several healthcare programs embody and reveal this collective belief, including the recent 
push for universal insurance through the ACA as well as several older public insurance programs 
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP.   
31
 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical 
Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 889 (2009) [hereinafter Moncrieff, 
Federalization Snowballs]. 
32
 See infra Part II.A.3.  
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government plays a useful role in regulating quality to protect consumers and in gathering and 
distributing information to help smooth asymmetries.  Both of these regulatory projects—both 
quality control and information provision—are fundamentally objectivist and data-driven 
projects.
33
 
But the information on which these projects must rely, namely information about health 
and medicine, is extremely costly to gather, and it is unreliable if data are gathered from small 
groups.  For example, one individual’s bad experience with a balloon catheter (a medical device 
used in heart surgery)
34
 tells us very little about the overall quality of the device, and it tells us 
very little about the quality of the surgeon who used it.  Perhaps the device is inherently faulty 
and will harm other patients, but perhaps the individual catheter malfunctioned on a fluke.
35
  
Perhaps the surgeon is usually sloppy and will harm future patients, or maybe the surgeon made 
an uncharacteristic mistake.  Or maybe the individual patient simply could not be helped.
36
  
Regulators will not be able to draw reliable conclusions about the device or the surgeon from a 
single datum. 
Instead, in order to reach firm conclusions on which regulators can base their decisions, 
policymakers need to gather data from many different stories.  Regulators need to know what 
happens when other surgeons use the balloon catheter to know whether the catheter suffers from 
a design or labeling defect.  They need to know what happens when the same surgeon uses other 
devices on other patients to know whether the surgeon presents a safety threat.  And they need to 
know what happens when other patients interact with the same catheter and the same surgeon to 
make sure that it isn’t some combination of the catheter and the surgeon that presents a danger.  
The more stories regulators can collect, the more reliable their conclusions will become.  
Furthermore, this same need for aggregated data holds for other goals of healthcare regulation, 
including cost control and access expansion.  Across a wide range of healthcare regulations, 
government benefits from scale—from the authority to gather information about many people 
from many sources. 
In addition to the regulatory need for data, scale is a significant advantage for public 
provision of healthcare because larger groups are more efficient at sharing risk.  The American 
healthcare regulatory complex largely centers not on interventionist regulation—not on exercises 
of police power to control cost, quality, and access—but rather on public provision of health 
insurance.  That is, a large portion of the government’s impact on healthcare markets occurs 
through Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP.  In those programs, the scale advantages of risk 
pooling become extremely important; public insurance, like private insurance, will be cheaper 
per person as more people join the pool.  A nationwide program like Medicare, thus, will be 
cheaper than a state-based program like Medicaid, even if all administrative decisions and costs 
are held constant between the two programs (obviously a counterfactual assumption). 
b. Redistribution 
                                                 
33
 See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and 
How) it Might be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323 (2010) [hereinafter Moncrieff, 
Assault on Litigation]. 
34
 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312 (2008). 
35
 See Moncrieff, Assault on Litigation, supra note 33, at 2365–67 (detailing a fuller explanation 
of information costs). 
36
 Id. at 2365–66. 
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 The other functional factor that seems important to healthcare regulation as a whole is 
redistribution.  Although this point rests on a subjective judgment that might be controversial, 
there seems to be broad agreement among American voters that all citizens are entitled to a 
minimum baseline of adequate healthcare.
37
  Certainly, this sentiment underlies the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”),38 which requires trauma centers, as a 
condition of Medicare participation, to stabilize any patient regardless of ability to pay.
39
  And 
this sentiment justifies public insurance programs for the poor, including Medicaid and SCHIP, 
which provide baseline coverage to those who are unable to pay.  If it is true that voters 
collectively prefer to guarantee baseline coverage for all Americans, then it makes sense to have 
the national government play a role in redistributing resources from richer states to poorer states 
in order to help the poorer states meet that baseline. 
Redistribution is also particularly important for programs that need to be counter-
cyclical—programs that should spend more when the economy is weaker.  Most states have 
balanced budget requirements and therefore tend not to deficit spend during weak economies, 
while the federal government, which has no such requirement, can spend beyond its means 
during economic downturns.
40
  For much of healthcare, this advantage of national control is 
irrelevant given that most healthcare costs are not counter-cyclical.  But public insurance for the 
poor is.  Medicaid, thus, benefits significantly from national contributions because more people 
will be eligible for the program during tough economic times than during strong economic times.  
Deficit spending might therefore be necessary for Medicaid.  
c. Spillover Prevention 
 According to Professor Moncrieff’s snowball theory, the national government has 
created a perpetual spillover problem in healthcare by adopting national insurance programs and 
tax incentives by which the central government bears a substantial portion of the costs of 
healthcare consumption.
41
  Because the national government pays for about forty percent of 
healthcare consumption, the states externalize a significant portion of their costs when they under 
regulate or over regulate healthcare in a way that drives up healthcare consumption.
42
  For 
example, if a state enacts a policy that increases healthcare consumption by one hundred dollars, 
the state will pay only sixty dollars of that cost.  This financial structure distorts the states’ 
incentives to keep consumption-related spending low.  While this problem certainly exists in 
theory, it is not clear whether it actually influences the states’ decision-making.  If it does, then 
only a full national takeover would fix the problem.
43
 
                                                 
37
 See Aimee Miles, Public Doesn’t Support Cuts to Health Care Programs, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/January/25/kff-harvard-
poll.aspx (showing that a majority of Americans support continued funding for medical 
entitlement programs). 
38
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
39
 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
40
 See generally GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE 
EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1993), available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/d44t15/148877.pdf. 
41
 Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs, supra note 31, at 848–49. 
42
 Id. at 861–65. 
43
 See generally id. at 868–72, 881. 
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Even if snowballing does not actually occur, there are other, more traditional spillovers 
that seem to infect some healthcare regulations.  For example, states might not have a full 
incentive to provide healthcare for the sick and the poor if their sick and poor constituents will 
move to more generous states.  In other words, states might be able to externalize the costs of 
under-providing public insurance for the poor if their citizens are mobile.  On the other side, 
states might externalize the benefits if they do provide such insurance because healed 
constituents might leave the state’s economy after benefiting from public insurance.  In short, the 
citizenry’s mobility might cause healthcare costs and benefits to spill over from state to state.  
This problem might cause a traditional “race to the bottom” in public insurance for the poor in 
the absence of national involvement. 
d. Uniformity 
 The most famous justification for national governance is probably the least relevant 
functional federalism factor in the healthcare regime.  Only for employer-sponsored insurance 
(“ESI”) does uniformity seem to be a compelling need.  For ESI, employers that operate across 
state lines benefit from uniform regulations of health insurance—a benefit that is embodied in 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)44 and to a lesser extent in the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).45  In the actual practice of 
medicine, however, there are few entities that operate across state lines; doctors and hospitals 
tend to practice in single jurisdictions.  In the individual and small group markets for health 
insurance, only a handful of national companies sell policies in multiple states.  For the most 
part, then, uniformity is not a compelling need in the modern healthcare market.  That said, the 
benefits of scale would apply to private health insurance as well as public, and if the regulatory 
regime were uniform, more national insurance companies might emerge and might be able to sell 
cheaper policies on the small group and individual markets—one of the goals of the ACA’s 
insurance exchanges. 
2.  State Advantages in Healthcare 
a. Experimentation 
 The most significant benefit of state involvement in healthcare is experimentation.  
As noted above, the greatest need in healthcare regulation is for information, and one invaluable 
means of generating information is through real-world experimentation.  If the states choose 
different policy approaches to manage the costs of, quality of, and access to healthcare, then 
regulators might learn which approaches work and which do not.  At a minimum, regulators 
would learn more through the states’ various attempts than they ever could from a single, 
uniform national policy.   
There are, however, limits to the usefulness of state-based experiments.  The biggest such 
limit is the demographic and sociological diversity among the states, which frustrates attempts to 
draw causal conclusions about the legal and policy approaches tried.  In other words, California’s 
experience with damages caps for medical malpractice does not tell us enough about Vermont’s 
likely experience with the exact same caps.  It is too difficult (if not impossible) to regress out 
the countless variables that distinguish California from Vermont, many of which might matter to 
the medical malpractice environment.   
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 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). 
45
 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified in various sections of titles 18, 29, 42, and 26 of the U.S.C.). 
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A second important limit is the insufficiency of one state’s incentive to gather, keep, and 
distribute reliable data about its own experiences with its own policy choices.  If California 
gathered and kept such data, it might benefit the state to some extent, but California itself could 
probably draw conclusions by observation, without detailed data or analysis.  The benefit of such 
investment in useable data, thus, would accrue primarily to other states and to the central 
government.
46
  California cannot recapture those externalized benefits, as by selling its data, and 
it therefore has an incomplete incentive to invest in the relevant information.  This problem is 
essentially a spillover problem that justifies some national involvement. 
b. Voice 
 Two aspects of modern regulation render voice less important than it used to be as an 
advantage of state government.  First, the increasingly objectivist nature of healthcare regulation 
diminishes the traditional importance of voice in regulatory decision-making.  Second, the 
increasing ease of communication makes small constituencies less necessary for capturing the 
benefits of voice.  If voters’ subjective preferences are not driving policy, then there is no need to 
place policy-making responsibility in the hands of a government that is particularly responsive to 
those preferences.  Large government can do a fine job—indeed, a better job given the scale 
advantages identified above—of collecting the information that is relevant to objectivist 
regulation.  Nevertheless, there are certainly some healthcare regulations that depend—or should 
depend—on subjective preference, including basic willingness to pay for various kinds of 
healthcare goods, and for those aspects of healthcare regulation, voice might be important.  
Furthermore, even for objectivist regulation, smaller governments might be better at the on-the-
ground project of gathering data and information.  But with modern communications technology, 
information about local needs and preferences no longer depends on physical closeness to the 
information source.  The federal government, thus, might be able to replicate state advantages, 
though there is still an argument to be made that state governments have stronger electoral 
incentives to pay attention to local needs and preferences. 
c. Diversity and Exit 
 As with voice, diversity and exit seem less important in a world of objectivist 
regulation.  In such an objectivist world, local preferences are less important than local needs, 
and needs seem less likely than preferences to diverge on a state-by-state basis.  Nonetheless, 
there might be divergent needs among states, and there might be aspects of healthcare regulation 
that ought to depend on preference.  For example, perhaps state populations should be free to 
decide—independently of other states’ preferences—how much they are willing to spend on 
public healthcare; that might be a legitimate variable preference.  It is certainly true that the cost 
of healthcare varies geographically, meaning that even uniform public insurance programs will 
have variable financial needs.  At a minimum, different states have different demographic 
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 Texas, however, keeps surprisingly meticulous records of its healthcare outcomes.  See 
Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1998–
2002, 2 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005); see also TEX. DEP’T OF INS., TEXAS 
CLOSED CLAIM REPORTING GUIDE (2009) (illustrating the process by which a closed claim is 
submitted to the TDI), available at 
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/company/documents/CCGuide2009.doc; TEX. DEP’T OF INS., 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION (2003) (synthesizing the 
data from the claim reports into various charts and graphs), available at 
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/hprovider/documents/spromptpay.pdf. 
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characteristics, and those characteristics might be relevant to both healthcare preferences and 
healthcare needs.  As such—and particularly given the absence of a compelling need for 
uniformity in healthcare—the national government might want to allow divergences of 
healthcare policy across the country.  
 The exit-based advantages of policy diversity might also hold for healthcare regulation, 
though the existence of spillovers and the potential for races to the bottom undercut that point.  If 
taxpayers are likely to leave states with generous public benefits for the poor and the sick, the 
competition among states for those taxpayers will result in too little public assistance relative to 
whatever the optimal level might be.  That said, national control of healthcare certainly would 
decrease exit opportunities if the central government set a uniform policy nationwide. 
3.  Capturing and Improving on State Advantages through National Regulation 
Given the virtues that the states can bring to the project of healthcare regulation—
however limited they might be—our readers might wonder why we advocate complete 
nationalization of healthcare policy.  At a minimum, our arguments so far support a role for state 
implementation so that states can diversify and experiment at the margins.  This “cooperative 
federalist” model is, in fact, the one that Congress has chosen for Medicaid, for which the 
national government sets a host of standards but allows states flexibility in complying with those 
standards and even allows states to violate some such standards if granted a waiver for 
experimentation.  The ACA expanded this particular cooperative federalist structure in its 
Medicaid provisions and relied on a similar federalist structure for the exchanges.
47
 
Importantly, though, Medicaid is not the only national healthcare program that runs 
experiments or that responds to local needs and preferences.  Medicare does, too.  It just does so 
without relying on state agencies for any policy design or implementation.  The Medicare 
program frequently runs demonstration projects to experiment with new policy ideas, and its 
local fiscal intermediaries make diversified decisions about coverage and compensation to meet 
differing local needs.
48
  Furthermore, Medicare can redistribute, diversify, and experiment on a 
more fine-tuned basis than the states because it is not governed by state boundaries; it can run 
single programs for constituencies that stretch across state lines just as easily as it can run 
programs for sub-constituencies within a given state, for state-wide constituencies, or for the 
national constituency.  And, of course, this national program does a better job than Medicaid of 
capturing economies of scale, redistributing resources across state lines, avoiding spillover 
effects in its regulatory decisions, and achieving uniformity of standards where necessary or 
appropriate.  In short, Medicare is a compelling model for a fully national healthcare program 
that captures many advantages of state governance.  Furthermore, because the national 
government can run localized programs without the arbitrary constraints of state borders and can 
govern regulatory regimes with a fully internalized incentive to gather and keep detailed 
information, the national government certainly has a greater capacity—a greater theoretical 
ability—in the modern objectivist world to capture the benefits traditionally ascribed to state 
governance. 
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 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA].   
48
 See generally CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, DEMONSTRATION 
PROJECTS AND EVALUATION REPORTS (2010).  
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III.  THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE ACA 
 This section uses the functional federalism analysis to evaluate four key parts of the 
ACA: the health and wellness incentives, the Medicaid expansion, the new regulations of private 
insurance, and the establishment of insurance exchanges.  In each area, the ACA increased 
national control relative to the pre-ACA world. Yet because many of the new programs follow 
the “cooperative federalism” model, they fall short of national governance while gaining few 
state advantages in return.  Worse still, the ACA replicated and extended the same “cooperative 
federalism” headaches of the past, despite the fact the 111th Congress apparently recognized 
these potential problems.
49
  From a functional federalism standpoint, future congresses should fix 
these errors and further centralize healthcare regulation. 
A.  Health and Wellness Incentives 
 The ACA takes a decidedly national approach toward promoting wellness that, in our 
view, succeeds under the functional federalism framework.  The wellness incentives in the ACA 
include menu labeling requirements, data gathering, and project grants for redistribution and 
experimentation.   
In an effort to fight obesity and to create greater awareness for healthy diets, the ACA 
ushers in national menu labeling requirements for restaurants and retail food establishments with 
twenty or more locations.
50
  These restaurants are now required to display “in a clear and 
conspicuous manner” the caloric content of each item as well as the suggested daily calorie 
intake.
51
  These restaurants must also have standard nutritional information about their food 
items available to their consumers in written form and on their premises.
52
  Because the menu-
labeling requirement applies to chain restaurants, regulatory uniformity provides at least some 
advantage because there is no need to suffer compliance costs from variable policies across state 
lines .  Thus, the nationalizing of menu labeling is an appropriate measure. 
 The ACA also seeks to improve public health by leveraging the national government’s 
scale to uncover the nation’s healthcare disparities through data collection and dissemination.  
Starting in 2012, “any federally conducted or supported health care or public program, activity, 
or survey” must “collect and report, to the extent practicable, (A) data on race, ethnicity, sex, 
primary language, and disability status for applicants, recipients, or participants, (B) data at the 
smallest geographic level such as State, local, or institutional levels if such data can be 
aggregated, (C) sufficient data to generate statistically reliable estimates . . . [of] subgroups for 
applicants, recipients, or participants,” and (D) “any other demographic data as deemed 
appropriate” by the Secretary of the Health and Human Services (“HHS”) regarding health 
disparities.
53
  Any data collected regarding racial and ethnic minority groups must also be 
collected regarding underserved rural populations.
54
  The data must be available to relevant 
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 For example, the ACA permits national involvement in the exchanges as a substitute if the 
states fail. ACA § 1321(c)(1)(B)(ii)(II), 124 Stat. at 186 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041). 
50
 ACA § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119, 573–74 (2010) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343). 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. sec. 4302 § 3101, 124 Stat. 119, 578–79 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300kk). 
54
 Id. at 581. 
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federal administrative bodies, such as Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services (“CMS”).55  
The Secretary must report the data through the HHS website, and she may make the data 
available for further research to non-governmental entities and the public.
56
  These national 
requirements will apply to data collection under state plans and SCHIP as well.
57
   
 This type of data collection and dissemination effort is best done at the national level to 
capture the greatest amount of reliable data and to minimize administrative costs.  Because of the 
way that HHS must collect the data, this effort will shed greater light not only on national 
healthcare trends, but on local ones as well.  Because the national government shoulders a 
significant portion of healthcare costs, it alone has the proper incentives to collect and to 
disseminate data as well as to encourage states and regulated industries to solve the demonstrated 
problems. 
 The ACA also seeks to promote wellness and prevention through targeted redistribution 
and experimentation.  These national efforts can reach a broader population while ensuring that 
local needs are addressed.  The law establishes the Prevention and Public Health Fund—a 
dedicated national funding mechanism administered by HHS that will “provide for [an] 
expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs to improve 
health and help restrain the rate of growth” of health care costs.58  The fund began with $500 
million in 2010 and will grow to two billion dollars by 2015.
59
  
 In addition to the Fund, the ACA mandates the Secretary of HHS to award competitive 
“community transformation grants” to state and local governmental agencies and to community-
based organizations that want to implement evidence-based community preventive health plans 
to reduce chronic disease rates and to address health disparities across the country.
60
  In creating 
this section, Congress appears to have been focused on ensuring that experimentation will bear 
fruit because the law requires the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to 
provide a literature review and to establish the framework for evaluating the plans as part of the 
grant program. The Director must also “work[] with academic institutions or other entities with 
expertise in outcome evaluation.”61  Grantees must meet at least annually to discuss “best 
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 Id. at 580. 
56
 Id.  
57
 Id. at 581. 
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 Id. § 4002(a), 124 Stat. at 541 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300u-11). 
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 Id. As of September 2010, HHS has awarded nearly $100 million in grants to promote 
HIV/AIDS prevention and testing, to “increase epidemiology, laboratory and health information 
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Release, Office of Health and Human Services, HHS Awards Nearly $100 Million in Grants for 
Public Health and Prevention (Sept. 24, 2010), available at 
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Sarah Kliff, Doc Fix New Weapon vs. Health Reform, POLITICO, Dec. 5, 2010, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/45976.html#ixzz17L6takUE; David Nather, House 
GOP Targets Health Care Funding, POLITICO, Feb. 11, 2011, 
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 ACA sec. 10403, 124 Stat. 119, 975 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300u-13). 
61
 Id. § 4201(d)(3), 124 Stat. at 541.  
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practices” and “lessons learned,” and they must “develop models for the replication of successful 
programs and activities and the mentoring of other eligible entities.”62  Unlike experimentation 
through Medicaid waivers, these grants can rely on private organizations that are not bound by 
state borders, and the regulatory structure ensures that a national agency is charged with 
collecting results from the experiments.  Depending on the degree of latitude afforded to the state 
agencies, this program could become another example, like Medicare demonstration projects, of 
useful national experimentation. 
 A similar focus on evaluation is also in place for the ACA’s authorization of HHS grants 
to state and local health departments and Indian tribes to carry out five-year pilot programs to 
improve the health of Americans from fifty-five to sixty-four years of age.
63
  Small employers 
may also receive HHS grants, but the ACA does not contain statutory language requiring 
national agencies to evaluate results of those experiments.  These small employer grants will go 
toward providing employees with “comprehensive workplace wellness programs,” as defined by 
HHS, but these grants must be “based on and consistent with evidence-based research and best 
practices.”64   
B.  Medicaid Expansion  
 The ACA uses Medicaid as a primary vehicle to expand healthcare to the uninsured.  
Although the law has brought greater consistency to the program by nationalizing eligibility 
standards and increasing national funding, the ACA nevertheless perpetuates the cooperative 
federalist structure.  States remain largely responsible for implementation or, in their view, left 
with problems like managing enrollment and controlling costs.
65
  The only silver lining to the 
ACA’s failures may be that its reforms have inched the ball closer to nationalizing Medicaid. 
 Before the ACA, only limited categories of low-income individuals—children, pregnant 
women, the disabled, and seniors—were eligible for Medicaid.  Because of the program’s 
cooperative federalist structure, states had the discretion to expand eligibility requirements, 
subject to federal rules.  Consequently, Medicaid eligibility varied state to state, and the program 
was an uneven safety net dependent on state political will, policy preferences, and budgets. 
 The ACA replaces that patchwork with a more uniform and equitable standard.  Starting 
in 2014, nearly all individuals under sixty-five with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty 
level will be eligible for Medicaid.  By streamlining eligibility requirements, the ACA opens 
Medicaid (and SCHIP) to about sixteen million new people, which raises the cost of 
administering the program.
66
  To pay for this expansion, the national government significantly 
increased its share of Medicaid funding through the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage 
(“FMAP”).  Specifically, to cover the care of the “newly eligible,” states will see FMAP cover 
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 Id. § 4201(c)(5)(A)–(B), 124 Stat. at 541. 
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100% of the differential from 2014 to 2016, 95% in 2017, and 90% in 2020 and thereafter.
67
  
This increased national contribution ensures that poorer states receive some redistributive 
assistance in reaching the floor of acceptable coverage.  Additionally, to help poorer states 
bolster their minimum floor of healthcare, the ACA will also increase FMAP, “subject to various 
requirements, . . . for certain disaster-affected states, primary care payment rate increases, 
specified preventive services and immunizations, smoking cessation services for pregnant 
women, specified home and community-based services, and health home services for certain 
people with chronic conditions.”68 
 Lawmakers correctly realized that this dramatic increase in Medicaid coverage would 
require greater national contributions to offset the states’ costs.  The increase in national funding 
is a good thing; state budgetary constraints and shortfalls made it unlikely for states to raise their 
minimum level of healthcare. Unfortunately, except to cover the care of the “newly eligible,” the 
FMAP funding mechanism is only partial assistance. The states must still balance federal 
financial incentives against their own needs and will probably continue to scale back coverage to 
the poor during economic downturns. 
 Additionally, fully nationalizing the funding of Medicaid would have given the national  
government more power to control costs and run experiments as it does in Medicare.  If 
Medicaid waivers have taught us anything, it is that state experimentation in this program 
teaches us very little.
69
  The system, rather than a thoughtfully structured process to produce and 
replicate good policy nationwide, has become a vehicle for states to execute their individual 
preferences haphazardly under lax federal supervision and an instrument for the national 
government to push its agenda without regard to useful experimentation.
70
   
 In other respects, the ACA exemplifies the national government’s potential for 
experimentation and innovation.  The statute orders the Secretary of HHS to establish four 
different demonstration projects: (1) a project on the use of bundled payments for the provision 
of integrated care around hospitalization,
71
 (2) a project on hospital payments under a global 
capitation payment model,
72
 (3) a project authorizing states to allow qualified pediatric medical 
providers to be recognized as an accountable care organization,
73
 and (4) a project requiring 
states to make payments to an institution of mental diseases for certain services for Medicaid 
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beneficiaries between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-five.
74
  Each project has different 
provisions on how HHS, or other entities, is supposed to evaluate and report the resulting data.
75
 
 The ACA’s efforts regarding Medicaid benefits, however, are to some extent 
disappointing.  The ACA does not require states to offer full Medicaid benefits to the “newly 
eligible.”76  Instead, the “newly eligible” will receive limited benefits packages commonly 
referred to as benchmark or benchmark-equivalent plans.
77
  In 2005, Congress gave states the 
flexibility to create these benefit packages as a way to reduce federal entitlement spending.
78
  
Benchmark plans need only be equivalent to coverage under the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program (“FEHBP”), coverage offered to state employees, an HMO Plan that has the 
largest insured commercial (non-Medicaid) enrollment in the state, or any coverage approved by 
the Secretary of HHS as meeting the needs of the population to be covered.
79
  At the same time, 
apparently aware of how varied these benchmark plans could be, the ACA does attempt to bring 
some uniformity and redistributive effect to the Medicaid benefits of the “newly eligible.”  It 
requires that benchmark plans include “essential health benefits,”80 and they are also required to 
cover prescription drugs and mental health services.
81
 
 Ultimately, however, the ACA’s approach to Medicaid does not harness enough of the 
national government’s advantage in healthcare regulation.  Once again, state implementation will 
dampen the advantages of national administration.  The differences between full Medicaid 
benefits and benchmark plans may be difficult not only for Medicaid beneficiaries who see a 
change in their circumstances,
82
 but also for the states who must deal with the administrative 
headaches.  The variance in funding—a significantly greater FMAP for the newly-eligibles than 
the pre-PPACA Medicaid population—may also create administrative troubles for the states in 
addition to the differentials in healthcare access and quality among the poor.  In short, the 
greatest disappointment is that ACA forewent an opportunity to turn Medicaid into a fully 
national program like Medicare.  Public insurance benefits from economies of scale, and national 
programs can still experiment.  The Medicare model is functionally superior. 
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C.  Private Insurance Regulations 
 The ACA contains numerous regulations designed to overhaul the private insurance 
market in favor of greater coverage and consumer protections.  These rules best reflect the 
national government’s ability to prevent “races to the bottom” and to set uniform standards to 
level the marketplace, foster competition, and benefit the consumer. For example, the ACA 
requires the Secretary of HHS, along with National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(“NAIC”), to develop national standards for group health plans and health insurance issuers to 
use in their summaries and explanations of their plans’ benefits and coverage.83  These standards 
must detail a uniform format, standard definitions, the required content, and they must be subject 
to periodic review.
84
 
 The ACA also establishes an “essential health benefits package,” that must be available 
to consumers through the exchanges in 2014.
85
  This provision gives the federal government the 
power to determine and standardize a federal floor that guarantees a minimum level of benefits.  
The new law contains several services that it lists as mandatory, such as ambulatory patient 
services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and 
substance use disorder services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative services and devices, 
laboratory services, preventive and wellness services, and pediatric services.
86
  Currently, only 
twenty-four states mandate standardized plans in their small group markets while just twelve 
states have standardized plans in their individual markets.
87
  
 The Secretary of HHS must ensure that the scope of the benefits is equivalent to “a 
typical employer plan,” and she must factor several enumerated criteria in determining the 
package (e.g., the balance of benefits and the health needs of diverse segments of the 
population). She must also periodically review and report to Congress whether modifying the 
package is needed.
88
  Qualified health plans must offer at least one “silver level” plan (benefits 
that are actuarially equivalent to seventy percent of the full actuarial value) and at least one “gold 
level” plan (benefits that are actuarially equivalent to eighty percent of the full actuarial value).89   
 The ACA also explicitly prohibits the practice of rescission, or post-claims 
underwriting.
90
  State laws governing rescission, guaranteed-issue, and preexisting conditions 
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varied dramatically pre-ACA.
91
  Prior to the ACA’s passage, only five states required any health 
insurer to accept every applicant, only one state required state pre-approval of rescissions, and 
more than half a dozen states failed to define preexisting condition entirely.
92
  Congress found 
that most states “were unable to answer basic questions about rescissions” occurring in their 
individual insurance markets.
93
  Under this fractured regulatory environment, some insurers  
aggressively rescinded coverage, often linking employee bonuses to canceling coverage despite 
affecting innocent policyholders.
94
  In fact, before the ACA’s passage, some insurance 
companies pointedly refused to limit rescissions only to policyholders who fraudulently obtain 
coverage.
95
   
 The ACA correctly replaces the mess with a simpler standard: a bar on group health plans 
and issuers in individual markets from rescinding coverage except in situations of fraud or 
intentional misrepresentation.
96
  The current law also permits states to be more protective than 
the new federal floor, and it requires prior notice—at least thirty calendar days—before coverage 
can be retroactively discontinued.
97
 
 The ACA also establishes a national minimum medical loss ratio (“MLR”) requirement. 
Prior to the ACA, only “a handful of states” required a MLR of seventy-five percent from 
individual or small-group insurers.
98
  Large group plans must now meet a MLR of eighty-five 
percent, while individual and small group plans must hit eighty percent.
99
  States can establish a 
higher MLR if they choose, though the Secretary of HHS may adjust the rates “on account of the 
volatility of the individual market” in each state.100  Insurers must submit annual reports of their 
costs and earned premiums to the Secretary, and those that fail to meet the relevant MLR must 
issue annual rebates to their policyholders on a pro rata basis.
101
  HHS has already issued an 
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interim final rule that details the reporting and rebate requirements as well as the enforcement 
mechanisms.
102
     
 Another immediate reform of the ACA is the ability of the Secretary of HHS to review 
insurance premium increases.  The law orders the Secretary, “in conjunction with the states,” to 
establish an annual review of “unreasonable” premium increases.103  Insurers that seek 
“unreasonable” increases must justify their plans and must disclose their justifications 
prominently on their website.  HHS has issued a proposed rule stating that for 2011,it will review 
increases of ten percent or more.
104
  Beyond 2011, the review will either remain at ten percent or 
be at a state-specific threshold established by the Secretary.
105
  Yet even with this review 
process, HHS cannot reject the proposed increases; insurers that unreasonably increase their 
premiums only need to submit a final justification.
106
  A final determination as to whether they 
can go through with the increase will depend on state law.
107
 
 These ACA provisions represent a significant step forward in the national regulation of 
insurance.  Yet, upon closer examination, a less positive picture appears.  Despite the 
establishment of national standards, much of the law depends on state implementation and 
enforcement.  Aware of this issue, the NAIC conducted several surveys “in an attempt to 
determine states’ ability to enforce the federal consumer protections scheduled to become 
effective plan years beginning on or after September 23, 2010.”108  In a letter to Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius, NAIC lauded the fact that “almost half of the states have concluded that they 
have the ability to enforce the federal law either through explicit state laws or general powers 
granted to the commissioner.”109  It also stressed that “almost all states can use their form 
approval process, investigative powers, and/or market conduct exam authority to hold licensed 
insurers accountable for their compliance with the federal laws.”110  The NAIC concluded that 
these efforts, “combined with coordinated enforcement by the federal regulators, should be 
sufficient to ensure carriers comply with the new requirements.”111 
 Although the NAIC couched its survey results positively, there is still reason for concern.  
That “[a]lmost half of the states” can enforce these national standards means more than half 
cannot.  For these states, how aggressively will they hold insurers accountable?  Without a 
centralized effort, enforcement will be spotty and recalcitrant states may undo the newly 
achieved national standard.  In fact, in the NAIC survey, Arizona responded, “In light of our 
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state’s participation in the multi-state lawsuit over the [ACA], it seems unlikely that [we] will 
pass legislation expressly authorizing any agency to enforce the [ACA] in the near future.”112  
Moreover, in 2009, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer instituted an indefinite rule-making 
moratorium, explaining that the state had “no plans to adopt rules related to [ACA] 
enforcement.”113   
 With regard to reviewing increases in health insurance premiums, inconsistent state 
enforcement is already emerging due to different state practices, resources, and regulatory 
authority.
114
  Furthermore, the HHS-proposed rule suggests that the national government will not 
be an independent source of aggressive enforcement.  Instead, the rule places HHS in a 
deferential posture to the states, stating that the ACA provision “only supplement[s] and 
complement[s], rather than supplant[s], and do[es] not interfere with, existing State laws and 
processes for rate review.”115  As long as a state has an effective rate review program, as 
determined by HHS, HHS will “adopt [the state’s] determination and will not conduct an 
independent review of the state’s determination.”116   
 If HHS rulemakers believe all states will implement this national standard effectively, 
they are too optimistic.  Last December, the Kaiser Family Foundation released a fifty-state 
survey in which they highlighted the drastically different approaches that states have toward rate 
review.
117
  The report made several discomforting conclusions.  Notably, most states make “little 
or no effort to make rate filings transparent” and “[m]any states lack the capacity and resources 
to conduct an adequate review.”118 
 Oddly, Congress recognized that states would have difficulty implementing this provision 
because the ACA authorizes HHS to dole out grant money for states to strengthen their rate 
review programs until 2014.  In August 2010, HHS issued the first of these grants, totaling $46 
million to forty-five states and the District of Columbia.
119
  Based on what these states plan to do 
with the money, such as increasing the transparency and the scope of the rate review process, it 
appears the states also recognize that they currently lack sufficient authority.  The states should 
take this opportunity and money to better their processes for enforcement of the provision.
 Not all provisions, however, have accompanying grants for states.  While states may be 
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better rate reviewers, other federal standards will go under-enforced.
120
  For all its 
groundbreaking, the ACA should not have ceded so much to state implementation.   
D.  Exchanges 
Finally, the ACA embraces a muddled federalism as its structure for the new, post-reform 
health insurance market.  Instead of creating a national insurance market for consumers and 
insurers alike, the ACA creates state-based insurance exchanges that may distort the regulatory 
effects of its reforms and hamper Americans’ ability to obtain coverage.  The current framework 
may have been necessary as a matter of politics, but it is flawed as a matter of policy.  
Implementing state-based exchanges prioritizes cooperative federalism at the expense of 
fulfilling the legislation’s policy goals effectively.   
1.  The Framework Behind the State-Based Exchanges 
 The ACA mandates each state to create an “American Health Benefit Exchange” to 
“facilitate[ ] the purchase of qualified health plans” by 2014.121  Each state must also create a 
“Small Business Health Options Program,” or SHOP exchange, for employers with 100 or fewer 
employees to enroll their employees in qualified health plans.
122
  The two exchanges may be 
combined “only if [a combined exchange] has adequate resources to assist” both individuals and 
small employers.
123
  All exchanges must be run by a state government agency or a state-
established nonprofit entity.
124
  The establishment of exchanges does not prohibit health 
insurance issuers from offering nor individuals and employers from enrolling in health plans 
outside of the exchanges.
125
  Nevertheless, issuers must treat individuals inside and outside the 
exchange as part of a single risk pool.
126
  This rule applies to small employers inside and outside 
of the exchange as well.
127
 
 Each exchange must execute, among other responsibilities, a rating system for each 
qualified health plan it offers, a website for consumers to compare plans, and a system to inform 
potential enrollees of their eligibility for SCHIP, Medicare, or other state and local programs.
128
  
The law requires the Secretary of HHS to issue grants to states as seed money to help establish 
their exchanges, but this funding ends by 2015.
129
  After 2015, the exchanges must be self-
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sustaining.
130
  If a state fails to establish an exchange, or meet all the standards, the Secretary 
must “directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit entity . . . establish and operate” an 
exchange within the state.
131
   
 The Secretary has the power to issue regulations with respect to the establishment and 
operation of the state exchanges, the offering of qualified health plans, and other such related 
requirements.
132
  Additionally, she has the power to investigate each exchange for fraud and 
abuse and she must conduct annual audits of each exchange.
133
  The Secretary’s oversight is 
coupled with the requirement that each exchange submit an annual accounting.
134
  The Secretary 
also maintains the power to establish, by regulation, the criteria for certifying health plans as 
qualified health plans.
135
  The criteria must, among other things, require minimum marketing 
requirements, ensure a sufficient choice of providers, and insist on certain qualify accreditation 
measures.
136
  Furthermore, the Secretary must develop a rating system for the plans at each 
benefits level based on relative quality and price.
137
 Nevertheless, it is ultimately each exchange 
that will certify the plans in a manner consistent with the Secretary’s guidelines.138  Thus, each 
state may require additional benefits to be offered, but it would be responsible for the cost.
139
 
 To ensure that consumers have options, the ACA contemplates the creation and 
regulation of nonprofit health insurance issuers under the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan 
(“CO-OP”) Program.140  The Secretary of HHS must award grants and loans toward the creation 
of these nonprofits in each state.
141
  If a nonprofit issuer fails to take hold in a state, the Secretary 
may use CO-OP appropriated funds to encourage the establishment of a nonprofit issuer or the 
expansion of another state’s qualified nonprofit issuer into the state.142 
 On the other hand, the new law also provides tremendous flexibility for states to establish 
alternative programs and options within, and in place of, insurance plans offered in their 
exchanges.  For example, subject to HHS certification, states can establish basic health programs 
for low-income individuals ineligible for Medicaid rather than offer plans through their own 
exchanges for these individuals.
143
  If they abide by certain qualifications, states can create 
subsidiary exchanges within their states.
144
  In 2016, upon HHS approval, two or more states can 
enter into interstate “health care choice compacts” that would allow qualified health plans to be 
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sold and bought across state lines.
145
  And in 2017, states can apply for waivers from the federal 
requirements if they can show that they can “provide coverage that is at least as comprehensive 
[and affordable] as the coverage . . . offered through [state exchanges].”146 
 Finally, in place of a public health insurance program, known during the health care 
reform debate as a “public option,” the ACA gives the Office of Personnel Management 
(“OPM”), a federal body that administers the health insurance plans for federal workers, the 
ability to sponsor nationwide health plans.
147
  The law mandates that the Director of the OPM 
contract with health insurance issuers to offer at least two multi-state qualified health plans 
through each state exchange.
148
  At least one of the issuers must be a non-profit entity.
149
  
Furthermore, like with the federal employees health benefit program, the Director has the power 
to negotiate the medical loss ratio, the profit margin, the premiums, and “other terms and 
conditions of coverage . . . in the interests of enrollees” with each health insurance issuer.150  The 
plans must meet all the minimum benefits requirements established elsewhere by this bill, and 
States can require additional benefits if they cover the costs.
151
   
2.  Criticism 
 Despite lodging some necessary power with the Secretary of HHS, this state-centric 
framework contains several flaws.  First, because this legislation places the initial burden on 
states to create the exchanges, every state’s political process will now become another politicized 
forum for health care opponents to delay or hinder the effort toward universal health care.  In 
other words, rather than closing the book on political fights and moving toward implementation 
or execution of a national exchange, this country will be headed for more political battles, fought 
at the state level, over the design and implementation of state-based exchanges.
152
  Lawmakers in 
over half the states have already begun to fight against what they perceive to be the overreach of 
federal power.
153
  This past year, the governors in six states fought their state attorneys general 
over whether to join the lawsuit challenging the individual mandate requirement.
154
  In states 
where conservative activists have succeeded in blocking or slowing down state implementation 
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bills, governors and insurance commissioners are looking to implement the ACA by skirting 
their legislatures through executive power.
155
  Ironically, rather than wanting to overreach, the 
Senate purposely chose a framework of state-based exchanges precisely because several key 
Senators believed that states should have the flexibility in creating their own plans.
156
  Yet, 
because of this leeway, those fundamentally opposed to health care reform now have a prime 
opportunity to block reform efforts.
157
   
 Second, state autonomy and flexibility may end up creating counterproductive solutions, 
which under the new law would simply return the problem back to the federal government.
158
  In 
establishing a “hierarchy between the federal and state governments” and having the states 
enforce and uphold exchange responsibilities, the federal government is pushing the costs onto 
the states without providing them with any resources to maintain their duties except initial start-
up money.
159
  The framework passed by the House, which gave states the option to create their 
own exchanges only if they could show that such exchanges would be stable, is a better approach 
and should have been adopted instead.  It would have guarded against failed state 
experimentation while still providing ambitious states the room to innovate.  Such a framework 
treats the federal government and the states as partners, “not as either underlings or wholly 
independent sovereigns.”160  While the federal government implements, enforces, and pays the 
national exchange through a new federal agency, states remain responsible for their traditional 
duties, such as insurer licensure and solvency, as well as enforcement of its own laws on behalf 
of consumers.
161
 
 Third, state-based exchanges are problematic because “[e]fforts by the states to establish 
open exchanges have largely failed.”162  Even among the more recent ones, Massachusetts’s 
exchange has seen qualified success.  Nearly everyone in Massachusetts now has health 
insurance, but the state has not succeeded in controlling costs effectively.
163
 Massachusetts’s 
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record should be understood in light of earlier “fairly significant reforms” that the state 
undertook before establishing the exchange.
164
 
 Relatedly, cooperatives designed to help small businesses purchase insurance failed in the 
1990s because they were never able to command any more than a small portion of the market, 
giving them little negotiation power and few options to choose from.
165
  Moreover, insurers 
began to select among firms, “signing up all the small business with generally health employees 
and offloading the bad risks—companies with older or sicker employees—onto the exchange.”166  
Premiums increased, and both insurers and small businesses began to leave.
167
   
 Fourth, the size of the risk pool is a significant factor.  Unless an exchange offers a 
sufficiently sized market, issuers can, and will, take their products elsewhere.  Yet, the very 
problem with state-based exchanges is the “risk that some smaller states may not have large 
enough risk pools.”168  A stable exchange should not only have a minimum size of 100,000 
people but it should also have at least twenty to twenty-five percent of non-Medicaid/non-
Medicare populations in the coverage pool.
169
  Before the final bill’s passage, some experts even 
suggested giving the Secretary the power to consolidate exchanges in order to achieve the 
100,000-person threshold to counter the effects of adverse selection.
170
  At least one former 
governor was quick to realize that his state will need to join neighboring ones to be an effective 
exchange.  Former West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin has said, “The borders don’t separate 
where the care might be given, and I have five borders . . . .  We’re going to work in conjunction 
with our fellow states, with our fellow governors, to make the best delivery system and the best 
economy that we can.”171 
                                                                                                                                                             
Massachusetts Governor unveiled his plan to tackle the state’s rising healthcare costs. Liz 
Kowalczyk and Noah Bierman, Patrick Unveils Health Overhaul, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 
2011. 
164
 AMY M. LISCHKO ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE MASSACHUSETTS 
COMMONWEALTH HEALTH INSURANCE CONNECTOR: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS 11 (2009),  
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2009/May/Issue
%20Brief.pdf. 
165
 MARK MERLIS, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM, A HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE: 
PROTOTYPES AND DESIGN ISSUES 4 (2009), http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-
briefs/IB832_HealthExchange_06-05-09.pdf. 
166
 Cappy McGarr, Op-Ed., A Texas-Sized Health Care Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009, at 
A31.  
167
 Id. 
168
 JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES, supra note 162, at 27. 
169
 ALAIN ENTHOVEN ET AL., COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MAKING EXCHANGES 
WORK IN HEALTH-CARE REFORM 8 (2009), 
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/MakingExchangesWorkinHealth-CareReform-
1701.pdf. 
170
 Id. 
171
 Karen Tumulty et al., The Five Keys to Health Reform’s Success or Failure, TIME, Mar. 25, 
2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1975068_1975012_1975007,00.ht
ml. 
 27 
 Fifth, programs similar to the forthcoming exchanges that have succeeded are national.
172
  
Administered by OPM, the FEHBP is “the largest single purchaser of health insurance benefits” 
in this country outside of Medicare and a “widely cited example of an exchange-like system.”173  
FEHBP offers federal employees and their families, who number over eight million, the option to 
choose from numerous health insurance plans negotiated in part by OPM.
174
  Unfortunately, the 
legislation does not explicitly give exchanges the power to negotiate directly, unlike the House 
bill.
175
  The many different state-based exchanges are also unlikely to secure the savings in 
administrative costs that a national exchange can achieve.
176
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Although the ACA accomplishes significantly greater centralization of authority for 
healthcare regulation, it falls far short of the full centralization that seems functionally justified.  
There is no doubt that the states have played an important role in healthcare regulation 
throughout the nation’s history, but that role is becoming increasingly irrelevant as healthcare 
regulation becomes increasingly technocratic—i.e., increasingly objectivist and data-driven.  The 
ACA is a step in the right direction, but the U.S. should further centralize authority over 
healthcare. 
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